RECENT CASES.

ATTORNEYS.
The plaintiff's counsel in an action for a personal tort, claiming an assignment of the cause of action and charging that the
Extnt f

settlement of the case and release of defendant

before judgment, but after verdict, was collusive
LJOR
and for the purpose of depriving them of their fees,
sought to establish a lien against defendant for their services.
It was held that execution could not issue against the defendant in the action because the assignment before judgment was
void, and the so-called charging lien did not attach until after
judgment. Tyler v. Superior Court, 73 At. Rep. 467 (R. I.)
The Common Law, on grounds of public policy, has sought to
discourage litigation and leave the door wide open to a peaceable settlement outside of court at any stage of the proceedings.
Hence the rule that all assignments of unliquidated claims for
damages for personal injuries, prior to entry of judgment, are
void. To be assignable the claims must be the subject of a
definite judgment. Stone v. Boston & Me. Ry, 7 Gray (Mass.)
539.
Since the cause of action is not assignable, no lien or interest
therein, legal or equitable, can be received by counsel prior to
judgment. Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163. Boogren v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 97 Minn. 5i . And as costs are
incident to recovery, it follows logically that the costs cannot
survive settlement of cause of action so as to charge defendant,
or place upon him the onerous duty of seeing that the collateral agreement of the plaintiff with his attorney is kept. In such
cases, counsel must be left to their Common Law remedy on
contract. Laniont v. R. R. Co., 2 Mackey (D. C.), 502. The
nature and extent of rights of counsel after judgment varies in
different States. In many, as New York and Georgia, the
whole matter is settled by statute. In the absence of statutory
enactment, the prevailing and better view seems to be the one
followed here, that the charging lien of an attorney extends only
to his taxable fees and disbursements, and not to his general
claim for compensation for his services. Ocean Ins. Co. v.
Rider, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 210. Swa'nston V. Morning Star Min..
(104)
Attorney's
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Co., 13 Fed. 215. Quakertown & E. R. Co. v. Guarantors
L. T. Co., 2o6 Pa. 350 (19o3). See, also, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, VoL 57, p. 642.
COMMON CARRIERS.
The Safety Appliance Act of 1893 construed. United States
v. Illinois Central R. Co., i7o Fed. Rep. 542 (i9o9).
(See note p. 87 of this issue.)
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Damages for delayed telegram. Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Hill, 50 Southern, 248 (19o9).
of this issue.)
(See note p.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In Dowds v. Swann et al, 73 At. Rep. (Maryland) 653,
where the question was raised as to whether photographing and
Invasion f

measuring under the Bertillon system a person

ie Right of arrested on a felony charge, but before conviction,
violated the personal liberty secured him by the
privxr
Constitution of the United States or of the State, it was held
that this method of identification was a necessary adjunct to
the police power for the preservation of the public peace, and
not a violation of the right of privacy under the Constitution.
The decision follows State v. Clausrneier, 154 Ind. 599. The
question presented is by no means a settled one. The New York
rule is flatly contradictory. In People v. Bingham, 107 N. Y.
Supp. iori, it was held that to subject a citizen to such indignities is entirely unnecessary, because the "public peace" cannot readily be disturbed by a man already in the custody of
the law. From a practical viewpoint it would seem that
at the present time, when escapes are so frequent and recapture so difficult, the police ought to be afforded the most
efficient means of identifying the fugitive, if recaptured. However, this power of the police should be strictly limited, as was
done in the present case, where placing the photograph in the
"rogues' gallery" or publishing the statistics in any manner, was
forbidden, as a wanton injury to the person arrested, unless
convicted or a fugitive from justice.
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CONTRACTS.
A and B entered into a secret agreement by which they bid
on separate portions of a public contract, with the understanding that if A's bid was accepted, they were to
Partnerhp

MrEti--tt

share as partners in such contract. It was held
that such an agreement was illegal in its tendency

c .titi~.

and condemned by public policy, and that an accounting of the profits of such partnership would
not be awarded. Citizens' National Bank v. Mitchell, io3 Pacific 72o (Oklahoma).

That such an agreement is against public policy and therefore void cannot be doubted. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S.
639. And it is not necessary to inquire into the particular
effect of such contract; it is sufficient if the general tendency
is illegal. Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. I49.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Forner jeopardy. State v. Barnes, io3 Pacif. Rep. 79z
(1909).
(See note p.
of this issue.)
In the case of Lowe v. State, 73 Atlantic Rep. 637 (Md.), the
appellant, having testified against his criminal confederate,
pleaded an implied promise of immunity, though
Rit
he had already plead guilty to the charge against
Accolite
who ,
him. It was held error for the Court to receive
the plea of Guilty without being satisfied that the

accused fully understood its nature and effect. It did not appear that the accused understood that the plea would be taken
as a waiver of the promised immunity from prosecution, or that
he intended thereby to make such waiver.
This decision is in accord with the weight of authority. See
U. S. v. Lee, 4 McLean, lO3, where on identical facts, the

Court was of the opinion that the promise of immunity by the
prosecuting officer was a pledge of public faith, which the Court
was bound to keep if the accused had acted in good faith and
had testified truthfully to the matters within his knowledge.
The rule is stated by Mr. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure,
Vol. I, as follows: "A defendant cannot be a witness for or
against another defendant, even though on separate trial, until
the case as to himself is disposed of by a plea of guilty, or a
verdict of conviction, by acquittal, discharge on a plea in abatement, or a nolle prosequi; then he may be, whether sentence is
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rendered against him or not. (Section 1020.) Thereupon the
accomplice pleads guilty and then testifies. If his testimony
is satisfactory, a nolle prosequi, or other form of discharge
follows. (Section 1166.)
If the prosecuting officer does not enter a nolle prosequi,
which is the better course, the Court will continue the case
until a pardon is procured. U. S. v. Lce, supra; State v.
Graham, 41 N. J. L. 15.
Under the general practice of American courts, the receiving
or rejecting of the testimony of an accomplice and his immunity
from prosecution is left largely to the discretion of the Attorney-General. Cont v. Knapp, io Pick. 493. But in some jurisdictions this question lies within the discretion of the Court.
Michelson v. Wilson, 6o N. Y. 362; Bowdcn v. State, x Texas
App. 137.
EXTRADITION.
In re opinion of the Justices to the Governor and Council,
89 N. E. (Mass.) i74. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
at the request of the Governor and Council, delivered an opinion on the duty of the Governor to
Jurisdict:
deliver tip on lawful demand by the Governor of
Governor's
New York, an alleged fugitive from justice,
Dty
charged in that State with murder in the first degree, but at the
time of the demand confined in a State prison on a conviction
of burglary. The opinion of the Justices authorizes a refusal
on the Governor's part to surrender the criminal until he has
served his term, holding that the duty to deliver up a fugitive
from justice, as imposed by Article 4, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, does not create a preference in the
enforcement of the laws of the demanding State.
This is in accord with previous decisions. Taylor v. Taintor,
i6 Wall. 366; In Matter of Troutman, 24 N. J. L. 6 34; State
v. Allen, 2 ltxumph. (Tenn.) 258. The general rule may be
stated that where jurisdiction has attached to a person or thing,
such jurisdiction is exclusive until it has wrought its function.
The Justices decide further that the Governor has no power
to surrender this convict, even if he should desire to do so.
This raises the much mooted question as to whether the executive's duty under the above Constitutional provision is a discretionary one or not. The general trend of authority since
1793 is that it is the Governor's absolute duty to surrender a
fugitive from justice, but with no means of enforcing this.
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against him except through his own sense of duty. Kentucky
v. Deninan, 24 How. 66. Consequently, a case like the present
arising, the Governor should immediately surrender the criminal, it not being permitted him to decide the legal effect of the
fugitive being in prison on his duty to deliver him up. It has
been suggested that the proper course in such a case as this is
for the Governor to issue a warrant of rendition, and let the
courts detain the prisoner. 13 Am. Law Rev. 238. This difficulty does not arise in Massachusetts, where the Governor is
permitted by statute to get the opinion of the Supreme Court
as to his legal duties.
FALSE PRETENSE.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in affirming the conviction in
State v. Germain, io3 Pac. Rep. 521, holds that a recital in a
receipt for money, "we promise to refund the
Elements
above amount paid," meaning to repay the emonen , of

tnzw

Title

ployment agency fee in case of failure to secure
a position,

did not indicate that the defendant re-

ceived the money as badlee. His promise to refund indicated
an intent not to return the identical money received, but to
treat the money as payment for services. To "refund" means
to repay, and the Court was of opinion that the title passed
upon the payment of the money to the defendant.
The disputable point was whether or not the circumstances
showed an intention on the part of the prosecutor to invest
the defendant with the title to the money, or merely to give him
the possession until he should have sought the position. If the
former, the conviction was right; if the latter, it cannot be
supported.
It is generally held that obtaining a loan of money is a sufficient obtaining to support a conviction for false pretences,
for since the prosecutor does not expect to receive back the
identical money lent, he parts with the title therein. In Rex
v. Crossley, 2 Lewin C. C., 164, the acceptor of a bill loaned
£250 to the maker, upon a false representation of the latter
that he had sufficient to pay the balance, and upon his promise
to so apply the money obtained, though he fraudulently intended
to use the money otherwise. He was held liable to conviction,
since the prosecutor had parted with the property in the money.
In State v. Ashe, 44 Kans. 84, the lending of the money was
good evidence of the intention to pass the title. In People v.
Oscar,.io5 Mich. 7o4, a conviction was affirmed for obtaining
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money by false pretences, when the transaction was a mortgage
negotiation, the defendant being the mortgagor.
An allegation in the indictment that the defendant "obtained
money as a loan with the intent, etc.," was held sufficient.
Coin. v. Coe, i15 Mass. 481.
The decision is well supported by the comparatively few
cases in the books: It is a payment with a provision for repayment only in case of a failure to obtain the situation offered,
while in the instance of a loan, there is the certain intention
that the money shall be repaid eventually. But that title passes
to the borrower and in the principal case, to the payee, there
seems to be no difference of opinion.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Legislative enactment limiting the use of demised premises.
O'Byrne v. Henley, So Southern Rep. (i909).
of this issue.)
(See note p.

MASTER AND SERVANT.
In the case of Cleveland, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 88
N. E. Rep. io73 (Ind.), the plaintiff, an employee, in passing
through the switch yard of the defendant railroad
AS,,=upti
was injured by his failure to see and avoid a fast
of Rgik:
train operated in violation of a speed ordinance,
ordinanze
and without signals or warnings. He was required to pass at
this point and was not negligent. It was held that the plaintiff
did not assume the risk of injury under such circumstances.
The decision of the Court in this case, following other cases
in the same State, agrees with the doctrine of the majority
of American jurisdictions. Where the statute imposing the
restriction expressly deprives the employer of the defense of
assumption of risk, of course such defense is not available to
him. And the conclusion seems to be the same where there is
no such prohibition. In Inland Steel Co. v. Kachwinski, i I
Fed. 219, the plaintiff was injured because of the failure of the
company to guard machinery as provided under the Factory
Act. The Court held that the employer could not set up the
defense of assumption of risk. In Spring Valley Coal Co. v.
Patling, 210 Ill. 342, it was held that a miner did not assume
the risk resulting from the mine owner's violation of an Act
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relating to mines. See also note to Shatto v. Erie R. Co., 59
C. C. A. 5. This question was fully considered by Taft, J., in
Narramorev. C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 96 Fed. 298,48 L. R. A.
68, and after a thorough review of the cases, a similar conclusion was reached. The New York Court of Appeals in
Kinsley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372, came to a contrary decision,
relying largely upon O'Malley v. South Boston Gas Light Co.,
158 lass. 135. It is submitted that the Court in resting upon
the O'Ialley case failed to give full weight to the fact that that
case was brought, not under a statute imposing a positive duty
of care on the employer in relation to the servant, but under
an Employers' Liability Act, which was designed to deprive
the master of certain defenses in suits for injuries sustained by
servants while in the master's employ. The Court in the principal case reached its conclusion, though the authority imposing
the restriction was a municipal ordinance anl not a public
statute; and in this it was undoubtedly correct, for a valid city
ordinance has the force of a legislative act upon those upon
whom it operates. Dillon: Municipal Corporations, Section
308
NEGLIGENCE.
Lou'cry v. Walker, L. R. (19o9) 2 K. B. D. 433, holds that
the owner of a horse, which to his knowledge had previously
other persons, is not liable to a trespasser
bitten
sclentet:
in the defendant's close, who is there attacked and
Owner's
tablityt
bitten by the horse, not kept there for the purpose
Tresassers
of inflicting the injury. Nor was the rule affected
by the fact that the defendant knew the public habitually trespassed in the field.
The case is to be distinguished from Bird v. Holbrook, 4
ling. 628, where the defendant was held liable on the ground
that even a wilful trespasser was not deprived of his right
to freedom from intentional injury.
It is said that the question to be determined in cases like
the principal case, is whether the man or animal which suffered, had or had not a right to be where he was when he
received the hurt. Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489. A wilful
trespasser has no right of action in respect to unintentional
injury caused by the owner's acts in the ordinary conduct of
his business. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co. v. Rourke, zO
Ill. App. 474; Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182. Placing
horses or cattle in the owner's pasture in the absence of an
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intent to injure, is treated as an act in the ordinary conduct
of the owner's business. Brock v. Copeland, i Esp. 2o3.
However, this is not the position of the Massachusetts Court
in Martle v. Ross, x24 Mass. 44, where to keep an animal (stag)
known to be dangerous, in the owner's pasture was said to be
negligence, for which, in the absence of contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the owner was liable. That the plaintiff

was a trespasser, is not such contributory negligence, if he did
not know of the dangerous character of the animal. This view

seems to he unsupported.

It places on the owner a greater

liability than the strong case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. P. 3 H.

L. 33 o . At best, the owner is only bound to keep the animal
secure at his peril. Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195. And
he is permitted to show that the damage was owing to the plaintiff's default. Idenz. Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 2 Ex. 1;
Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489.
The second point of the principal case, that although one
has knowledge from which he should anticipate the presence
of trespassers, he is not bound in the ordinary conduct of his
business, to take care that they shall not be injured, seems to
be the consistent attitude of the English courts. The knowledge
of a R. R. Company that trespassing was of common occurrence at a certain point imposes no duty on it to take care.
Harrison v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 1874, 29 L T. 844. A
reply that before the excavation on the defendant's land, he
knew the public constantly made use of a road over the land,
and that he made the excavations without taking reasonable
precautions to protect the public, was held bad on demurrer,
there being no duty to do so. Murley v. Grove, x882, 46 J. P.
36o.
The American courts are not so consistent The Massachusetts view is in accord with the English doctrine, holding that
a railroad company owes no duty of care toward trespassers
whose presence, from past experience, might have been reasonably anticipated, though such trespasses on the part of the
public are habitual at the certain point: Chenery v. R. R., x6o
Mass. 211. Accord: Cannon v. R. R., 157 Ind. 682; Ill. Cent.
R. R. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500. In Pennsylvania and New York
the doctrine is otherwise, and it is held that under such circumstances the railroad company, not having objected to
known habitual trespasses, is in the position of a licensor and
therefore bound to take care. Taylor v. R. R., 113 Pa. 162;
Barry v. R. R., 92 N. Y. 289.
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The plaintiff in a recent case in New York was run into by
an automobile owned by the defendant and operated by defendant's chaffeur, who at the time of the accident
Automobile,
was taking a pleasure trip with the owner's conDangerous
sent. The court charged that "The owner of an
Instrument:
Owner's
automobile
be responsible for
caused by it should
by the negligence of any oneinjuries
whom
he permits to run it in the public street," and this charge was
sustained. Ingraham v. Stockamore, i18 N. Y. Supp. 399The basis of the decision is that an automobile is a dangerous
machine, and as a safeguard to the public the owner should
in all cases be held responsible except where it is taken and
used without his consent. This is a novel and very broad doctrine, appirently the only authority for it being in the dissenting opinion in Cunningham v. Castle, 127 N. Y. App. Div. 58o.
The opinion of the majority of the Court in that case represents the prevalent rule in New York and throughout the
country, that the only basis of the owner's liability in such
a case -is the relationship of master and servant, and conseqently the owner is only liable for the negligence of the operator, where the latter is an employee, and acting within the
scope of his employment. Doran v. Thomsen, 66 Atl. (N. J.)
897; Slater v. Thresher Co., 97 Minn. 305. There is some
conflict of opinion as to whether an automobile is within the
dangerous article class. It would seem that this fact is essential only in proving the actual negligence, either of the operator in the running of the machine or of the owner in providing
a competent operator, under the rule "the greater the danger
the greater the care required." The rule above goes further.
It would hold the owner liable on the score of the dangerous
character of his machine, where he has done everything in
his power to safeguard it and injury is admittedly due solely
to the negligence of a competent operator. However, the present tendency of the courts is undoubtedly to increase the liability of automobile owners.
In an action to recover for personal injury received by reason
*of a defective sidewalk in a city, proof that notice of the degiven to a police officer, who although
fect
tPolk*
of
it washadnobeen
part of his official duty, was nevertheless
rdcbvmy
in the habit of reporting defects to the highway
commissioners, was held insufficient. Abbott v.
City of Rockland, 73 Atlantic, 865 (Me.). In accord is the
case of City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 96 Ga. x77.
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Where policemen have been charged with the duty of reporting defects in sidewalks, it has been held that notice to
such policemen was notice to the city. City of Joliet v. Looney,
159 Ill. 471. In Slihinick v. City of Marshailtown, 114 N. W.
542, it was held that notice to the mayor of an obstruction in the
street was notice to the city.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
In an action to recover on two negotiable bonds payable to
bearer, defendant introduced evidence, undisputed, that plaintiff got the bonds from her husband, who procured
them frautdulently from their true owner, a then
Irmediat
Intermediate
extinct corporation.
Holders
Burdea ofp
Held, while possession of such an instrument is
Proof
prima facie evidence of lawful ownership, possession alone cannot support recovery, after it once appears that
the title of an internediate party is defective. Proof that the
negotiable instrnment was once in the hands of a fraudulent
owner raises the presumption that it continues in the hands of
a holder of that character, until the contrary be proved. Therefore, in such a case, whether the fraudulent practices were connected with the original inception of the paper, or, as in the
present instance. occurred subsequently, to the prejudice of an
intermediate holder, the onus rests upon plaintiff to .show that
he is a bona fide holder for value. Parsons v. Utica Cement
Co.. 73 Atl. Rep. 785 (Conn.).
While the case of Kinncv v. Kruse. 28 Wis. 183. asserting
that "the fraud in putting the note -into circulation which will
operate as a defense, or change the burden of proof in such
an action, must be a fraud against the defendant," takes a
contrary view, the present decision is supported by the great
weight of atuthority; it ii not only expressly covered by Section
59 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but is also in conformity with well-established Common Law principles. Collins v.
Gilbert. 94 U. S. 753; Fulton Bank v. Phoenix Bank, i Hall
(N. Y.) 562.
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PATENTS.
In the recent case of In re Hatschek's Patcnts, C. R. (1909),
II Ch. Div. 68, it appeared that while the invention, for which
letters patent in England had been granted, was
Revocation
k-Failurete. in commercial operation in Germany, France and
Belgium, it had never been worked in the United
Establisb
Indust"

Kingdom.

Instead of attempting to establish a

new home industry the patentee had devoted himself to the
establishment of industries abroad, and had exercised his
monopoly privileges to secure to a foreign licensee the exclusive right of selling in the United Kingdom articles manufactured abroad. Upon the failure of the patentee to show that
the patented process was. carried on to an adequate extent
within the United Kingdom, or. give satisfactory reasons therefor, the Court summarily revoked the patents. The decision
turns upon the interpretation of Section 27 of the Patents and
Designs Act of 1907, passed to prevent foreign traders being
given a preference over British traders, and will be read with
interest by those lawyers who make patents their specialty.
REAL PROPERTY.
Re-entry and forfeiture of estates on condition.
Sharpe, 121 S. W. 341 (1909).
(See note p. 89 of thisissue.)

Moore v.

STATUTES.
In State v. Wheeler, 89 N. E. (Indiana) i (igo9), an action
was brought by the claimant to a public office against the incumbent to test the validity of the statute under
which the defendant held the office. The unusual
Enroted Bin
AdMnibll
t -feature of the case was that the certificate of the
5
ofra
Secretary of State in the published laws of the
Testimoay
Prove BI.
State showed that the statute as printed had been
compared with the engrossed bill, since the enrolled
Vtoed
bill was missing. The Court said that where the
enrolled bill was missing, they must inform themselves from the
best possible sources, in this case the laws published by authority
of the State and the Journals of the legislature. Oral evidence,
which the defendant attempted to introduce to show the bill
had been vetoed, was held inadmissible. This decision'is in
accord with the early cases. Prince's Case, 8 Coke, 28. The
same principle is applied to a somewhat different state of facts
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in Gardnerv. The Collector, 73 U. S. 499-- It is not an exception to the rule announced in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S.
649. "When an enrolled act is signed by the presiding officers
of the two houses of Congress, approved by the President and
deposited with the Secretary of Stoite, according to law, its authentication is complete, and it cannot be impeached by the
Journals of Congress." For the attitude of the various States
on this question see the note to Field v. Clark, supra, at page
66t.
TRADE MARKS.
Where two parties have used the same trade mark in the
same business, though in different localities, but have now
overlapped sales territories, the exclusive use in
rcots
the territory in question is awarded to him who
Usen

Lotais

first devised and used the trade mark. Thos. G.
Carroll & Son Co. v. Mcllvaine & Baldwin, 171
Fed. Rep. 125.

This seems to be in accord with well-established principles
of the law of trade marks. The exclusive right to the use of
a mark or device claimed as a trade mark is fotmded on priority of appropriation. Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, i5o U. S.
460. The question is, which party first made use of the trade
mark or name in this particular business. Stachelberg v. Ponce,
128 U. S. 686; Walton v. Craa'ley, 3 Blatchf. 44o.
Having decided this point upon the evidence, with a conclusion in favor of the defendant, Hough, J:, proceeds to a discussion of the merits of the case upon any view of the evidence,
therein giving recognition to a principle which may be stated
thus: The right to a trade mark adopted and used by its originator in territory "A" is not such a vested right as to give
him the exclusive use thereof in a second territory, "B," unless
he is also the first to invdde that territory and there to associate
the trade mark with the business in question.
In reaching such a conclusion the court proceeds upon two
grounds. First, the owner of a trade mark has no estate in a
trade mark as such; the adoption of words is useless without
a business; the exclusive right to an ordinary trade mark
grows out of its use and not from its mere adoption. United
States v. Steffens (Trade Mark Cases), IOO U. S. 82; Avery
v. Merkle, 8i Ky. 73; Schneider v. Williams, 44 N. J. Eq. 39.
Second, the defendants have built up a large and profitable
business in the territory "B" for the article sold under the
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litigated trade mark. The injunction in trade mark cases is
primarily designed to prevent the public from being misled and
deceived. If the defendant be enjoined, complainant continuing to sell, the public will be deceived, thinking they are purchasing the goods of the defendant. Therefore to grant an
injunction under such circumstances, would be to disregard
the most important branch of the equitable rule invoked.
As to the fiist, there is no doubt that the right to the exclusive use of a trade mark is dependent not upon adoption, but
upon adoption and application to the article in trade. Brouwne
on Trade Marks, Section 52; McAndrews v. Bassett, 4 DeG., J.
& S. 380.
The criticism of the position of the Court is that the complainant is shown by the evidence to have long used the trade
mark in this business in the territory "A," that being by the
hypothesis prior to its use in territory "B" by the defendant.
The Court has added to the general rule the requirement that
It must have been adopted and put into use in that territory
where" the exclusive right to it is now asked. As authority
therefor the case of Carzdtn v. Daly, 7 ]3osw. (N. Y.) 222, is
cited. This case holds that a privilege of monopoly in a certain
trade mark does not carry a similar exclusive right to it in
other markets where it has been and is now being used by
others. -The sentence, "They have not monopolized all the
markets of the world," indicates the trend of the argument.
In Teflow v. Tappan, 85 Fed. 774, it was held that the recognition of a prior right to the use of a trade mark in a locally
confined business in a distant city, did not invalidate the complainant's title thereto as against a proven invader of territory
wherein complainant operated. But it will be noted that this
is a three-party case and not conclusive as to',ny attitude, had
the owner of the prior right himself been the invader of the
territory of complainant To the same effect-is Sartar v.
Schaden, 12S Iowa, 696.
"
The weight of authority seems opposed to this addition,wbich
it is indicated should be made to the requirements for the acquisition of a trade mark. The right of prot
in a trade mark
is not limited in its enjoyment by terr i
bounds, but, subject
only to local statutory regulations, the proprietor may assert
and maintain his right whenever the Conmmon Law affords
remedies for wrong. Derringerv. Plate, 4 Cal. 2W. Trade
marks are an entirety and are incapable of exclusive use at
different places by more than .one independent proprietor; for
in seeking redress, in order to:stablish an exclusive right to
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the mark, at any one place, the party must show an exclusive
right to its use generally. Manhattan Medic. Co. v. Wood, 4
Cliff. (Fed. Cases) 461. Though having conceded the complainant's prior use. the Court denies his right to the trade
mark in territory "B," yet his right in his original territory
"A" would not be denied him, which gives rise to the condition
here said to be impossible. Nor do the English cases support
the dictum of the case. In Collins Co. v. Bro-Wn, 3 Jur. N. S.,
p. I, 929, 1857, it was held that an American who had acquired a trade mark in this country, but had never used it in
England, was entitled to restrain a British subject from using
it there. In accord: Collins Co. v. Reeves, 28 L. J. Ch. 56,1859.
It is also of interest that the French books contain a direct
authority against the addition to the law suggested by the principal case. Priority in the adoption and use of a trade mark,
though in a different territory from that where the alleged infringement took place, will give one the exclusive right thereto
whenever piracy occurs, even though the infringers have used
the trade mark long before the conflict in sales territories took
place. Holtzen & Co. v. Lcndcnbcrg & Co., 14 Annales, x67.
As to the second ground, the primary object of the injunction in trade mark cases may be disputable. The office of a
trade mark, and therefore, of its protecti6n, is to point out distinctively the origin of the article to which it is affixed; to give
notice who was the producer that he may secure to himself
the ultimate benefit of good workmanship. Lawrence Mfg. Co.
v. Tcnnessce Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537; Schinaltz v. WooleV,57
N. J. Eq. 303. It would therefore seem that the second branch
of the court's argument must depend upon the validity of the
first conclusion as to who shall have the right in the contested
territory.
It may be remarked that the facts of the case, even conceding priority to complainant, would support the result attained by the Court on the ground of laces. Note to Taylor
v. Sawyer Spindle Co., 22 C. C. A. 211.

